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Markets have existed for at least as long as written records exist. History shows that markets have been the primary mechanism by which human needs and wants are met and satisfied.
History also shows that many important markets are limited by laws and customs enforced by political and religious authorities. The most extreme limits range from bans on trade to prohibitions on migration to grants of monopoly. The result in all cases is that favored individuals and firms earn 'rents,' or an excess payment over and above the amount expected in open markets. The consequences of limited markets are not as simple as introductory economics suggests, but they generally result in a significant loss in social welfare.
The importance of markets has led to much theorizing and analysis of market structure. North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) is an important recent work tackling this issue. They argue that most societies in human history can be described as 'limited access orders,' where the ruling coalition limits entry to markets and the political system. The resulting rents give elites in the ruling coalition an economic incentive to support the regime rather than undermine it through violence or other means. Some limited access orders can be fragile, such that commitments to elites are fluid and unstable. Shocks can easily lead to violence and the creation of a new coalition. There is an alternative system, which is much rarer, called 'open access orders.' Here governing coalitions do not limit entry to markets and the political system. Instead social stability is sustained through political and economic competition. Open access orders are also capable of sustained development above and beyond what is possible in limited access. The interesting question then is why don't all societies transition from limited to open access orders?
Providing a satisfactory answer to this question is extremely difficult. The approach taken by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) is to use history to illuminate the transition. They propose three doorstep conditions in the transition from limited to open access: the rule of law for elites (doorstep 1), the existence of perpetually lived organizations (doorstep 2), and consolidated political control of the military (doorstep 3). Rule of law for elites is achieved when law is applied equally to all elites and is enforced without bias. In such settings, elite-owned assets and organizations are protected from predation even when the ruling coalition changes. Perpetually lived organizations are those whose existence is independent of the lives of their members.
Companies formed under general incorporation laws are good examples of perpetually lived organizations, but there are many other examples in the public and religious spheres.
The aim of this paper is to study how the rule of law for elites and perpetually lived organizations emerged in England in the case of the East Indian market. As in many European countries, the trade between England and the East Indies (i.e. modern day India and China) started under a monopoly. The monarchy, who controlled foreign trade, wanted to encourage investments in shipping and fortifications and generate new tax revenues. Monopoly also contributed to political stability, at least in the short-run, because it provided rents to supporters of the monarch. The English East India Company is notable in the broader literature because it paved the way for Britain's colonization of India (Bowen 2005) . The English Company is also notable for the longevity of its monopoly. Its trading privilege began in 1600 and was not significantly curtailed until 1813.
Despite its long history, the English East India Company's monopoly was far from secure, especially in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century. The king and parliament authorized groups known as interlopers to trade in East Indian markets, which violated the terms and spirit of the Company's monopoly trading privileges. The king and parliament also forced the Company to lend it money or it demanded payments in order to retain its monopoly. As I argue below, political instability and fiscal incapacity were the root causes of the insecurity of the Company's monopoly. The Company was politically connected, like most elite organizations, but these connections diminished when the government changed, as it often did in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Credibility was also weakened by the fiscal system which evolved slowly at this time. Warfare was also important as it made the monarchy desperate for loans, which the Company could best provide in the era before modern public finance.
What is remarkable about the East Indian monopoly is that it became more secure by the mid to late eighteenth century. Previously the Company's trading privileges were renegotiated according to the dictates of politics and finance. But after 1750 the monopoly was renegotiated only when the terms of the previous charter expired. Thus an important step was taken towards the rule of law for elites. The achievement of political stability under the Whig Oligarchy and the greater capability of Britain's fiscal and financial system were some of the key factors behind this step.
However, Britain had not yet reached the second doorstep condition, existence of perpetually lived organizations. The government still required the Company to renew its monopoly trading privileges after a term of 10 or 20 years. In the background of these negotiations there was always a threat that the government would revoke the Company's monopoly. In the charter acts of 1781 and 1793 the Company's strong political connections to the King's government and the governing party in the House of Commons helped to maintain its monopoly. The government was also keen to preserve the monopoly because it entered into a 'profit sharing' arrangement with the Company with the aim of extracting revenues from Indian territories.
A huge step was taken in the 1813 charter act where the Company lost its monopoly over trade with India. From that point forward, any private trader could enter the Indian market. The opening of access was due to several long term factors like the growing strength of the free trade lobby and the expansion of the fiscal system as a result of the Napoleonic wars. The assassination of the Prime Minister in 1812 also played a role. In the election that followed the Company's connections to the governing party in the Commons were much weaker than in previous years.
This paper contributes to a broader understanding of the transition from limited to open access. It complements studies in other markets and countries.
2 The paper also contributes to a larger literature on the evolution of markets and British institutions. 3 The history of the Company suggests that market-supporting institutions evolved slowly in Britain, and did not improve as dramatically following moments of constitutional reform, like the Glorious Revolution. The emergence of political stability and the development of the fiscal system and public finance appear to be more important factors in the case of the East India Company.
I. The Origins of Monopoly in the East Indian Trade
The East India Company was founded in 1600 through a charter granted by Queen Elizabeth.
Management was in the hands of a governor and a board of directors. Shareholders elected the governor and directors subject to a minimum number of shares. The Company was given a monopoly over all trade and traffic from the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Magellan-an area encompassing much of the world's population! It was to last 15 years, except if the 2 See North, Wallis, Webb, and Weingast (2012) and Franke and Quintyn (2014) for some examples. 3 North and Weingast (1989) , Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) , Pincus (2009 ), Cox (2011 , 2012 , Clark (1996) , Zahedieh (2010) , Sussman and Yafeh (2006) , Mokyr (2009 ), Stasavage (2003 , Broz and Grossman (2004) , Quinn (2001) , Wells and Wills (2000) , Klerman and Mahoney (2005) , and Carruthers (1999) .
Company violated the provisions of the charter. In that case, the charter could be voided by the monarch with two years notice (Scott 1912, p. 92) .
The East Indian trade was not unique in being organized around monopoly. Jha (2005) identifies 28 chartered companies in foreign trade from 1555 to 1640. Most of these companies were granted a monopoly over trade with a particular region like the East Indies. Why was monopoly so common? In addressing this question, the first fact to understand is that the British monarch had complete authority to regulate foreign trade, so it could chose the organizational form and market structure that suited its needs. The next interlopers were headed by Richard Penkevell. In 1607, they were given a grant to discover the Northern passage to China, Cathay, and other parts of the East Indies (Scott 1912, p. 100 (Bruce 1810, pp. 193-194) .
The 1620s marked the beginning of a prolonged period in which the Crown tried to extract revenues from the East India Company. Scott's (1912, pp. 125-126) analysis of the Company's early dividends shows that the trade had proven to be profitable to investors. At the same time, the King's tax revenues were stagnating making the Company an attractive target for extraction.
In 1620 James I ordered the Company to pay £20,000 to himself and the Duke of Buckingham on the grounds that the Company captured prizes from Portuguese ships (Chaudhuri 1965, p. 31) .
A few years later in 1624, James I offered to become an adventurer and to send out ships under the royal standard. The Company refused the offer on the grounds that 'the whole undertaking would revert to the Crown, since there could be no partnership with the King.' In 1628 there was another scheme to admit King Charles I as an adventurer for one-fifth of the stock and profits in return for taking the Company under royal protection. The Company refused once again (Scott 1912, pp. 108-112) .
Charles I's failed attempt to gain ownership in the Company provided an opportunity for the interlopers. In 1635 a new syndicate obtained a license from Charles I for a trading voyage to Goa, Malabar, China, and Japan, an activity considered to be within the bounds of the Company's monopoly (Scott 1912, p. 112 Courteen were for a voyage of discovery. The King also stated that the East India Company neglected to make discoveries and plantations in the East, and thus had no legal basis to protest.
10
The Courteen Association got further support from Charles I in 1637 when the King authorized the partners to send out ships and goods to the East for five years 'without impeachment or denial of the East India Company or others' (Scott 1912, pp. 113-114) . The Courteen Association was generally unsuccessful in its trading ventures, but in the process the Association caused much damage to the Company.
The Company experienced further extractions in 1636 and 1641. In 1636, Charles I increased the customs duties on pepper by 70%. The result was that the customs duties derived from the Company's trade were yielding around £30,000 per year by the early 1640s (Foster 1904 (Foster , 1929 . At this same time, the political conflicts between Charles I and parliament were increasing making the King's fiscal situation dire. In this context, the King forced the Company to hand over its stock of pepper which was valued at £63,283. The so-called 'pepperloan' of 1641 was to be repaid in four installments and was secured by the farmers of the customs. The Company had recovered around £21,000 by the late 1640s, but at this point Charles I was executed and the Monarchy was abolished. The remainder of the pepper loan was lost for the moment, and was only partly recovered in the 1660s.
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III. The East Indian Monopoly under the Commonwealth and Restoration
The Pepper loan of 1641 set a precedent in which the Company would make loans to the government in exchange for greater commitment to protect their monopoly privileges. The same tactic was sometimes used by interlopers when they tried to gain a legal position in the market.
The loans were effective because tax revenues fell far short of the government's needs during the Commonwealth, Protectorate, and Restoration periods. However, the loans were not sufficient to settle the market because of the continual turnover in political power.
Under the Commonwealth government executive powers were held by the Council of State, which was appointed by leaders of the Rump Parliament. In 1649 a group of interlopers known as the 'Assada Adventurers' appealed to the Council of State. They asked for assistance against the Company and an application for a voyage to Asia. The Adventurers offered a loan of £4,000
to the Council to advance their cause. In the same year, the Company also appealed to the Council of State to protect its interests and offered a loan of £6,000. The Council of State recommended a merger of the two companies, which was enacted in 1650 and became known as the 'United Joint Stock' (Scott 1912, p. 120 ).
The United Joint Stock financed a series of voyages in the early 1650s, but it was not a success in part due to continual entry by interlopers. In 1651 an appeal to suppress interlopers was made to Oliver Cromwell, whose authority in the Council of State was increasing. Cromwell gave a disinterested reply in writing stating that 'he has much public business and that he neither could nor would attend to private matters' (Scott 1912, p. 121) . Once Cromwell rose to the position of Lord Protector in December of 1653, the Company again tried to seek his assistance.
In 1655 (Foster 1929, pp. vi-vii, xxxii) . Also its recent charter from Cromwell was nullified. In the wake of these events, the Company set out to renew its charter by appealing to King Charles II. As a sign of loyalty the Company gave the new King a plate estimated to be worth £3,000 and his brother James, Duke of York, received cash worth £1,000. These 'gifts'
were followed by a new charter in 1662 and a loan of £10,000 to Charles II (Scott 1912, p. 131 (Scott 1912, p. 178) .
Over the course of the 1670s, the East India Company earned large profits and its share price rose from around 80 in 1672 to 365 in 1681 (Scott 1912, p. 139 Scott (1912, p. 146 ), Papillion's group was fortunate as they sold at the peak of the market for Company shares.
IV. The East Indian Monopoly in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution
The Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 is thought to be a watershed moment in the evolution of Britain's political institutions because it gave parliament greater authority over government and supposedly increased the security of property rights (North and Weingast 1989) . While there may be some truth to this view, in the case of the East India Company the Glorious Revolution looks similar to earlier regime changes in which interlopers were emboldened by a weakening in the Company's political connections. What was different in this case is that interlopers came to be allied with a powerful political party, the Whigs. Also, in the short-term the Glorious Revolution greatly increased the King's need for loans because it led to an expensive war with
France. effectively allow them to take-over control of the Company from the governor Josiah Child.
They also proposed that in twenty one years the holdings of the Company should be wound up and a completely new subscription of capital should then be made.
It is revealing that the Company responded to these proposals by likening its monopoly to landed property and appealing to the Rule of Law. An anonymous author, clearly working in the interest of the Company, argued that restricting voting rights of shareholders in the Company is "against the laws and customs of England." They go on to argue that "the Company by the true rules of policy ought never to alter nor any man be forced to sell its stock, any more than he can be forced to buy a stock that has none; or any gentlemen that has an over-growth estate in land in any country can be forced to sell part to make way for some purchasers that pretend they will buy land in that country." The shifts in political power mattered for the East India trade because the Company was connected to the Tories and its opponents were linked with the Whigs (Horwitz 1978 In the context of the 1690s changes in the party in power could bring an end to the Company's trading privileges. The Company was under attack throughout the 1690-95 Parliament, but it was able to defend itself with the help of the Tories who were in the majority.
However, once power shifted to the Whigs from 1695 to 1700 the Company was unable to defend its privileges against its opponents who were now better connected. The Whig leader Montagu argued strongly in favor of the New Company which eventually gained the exclusive right to trade. Also telling is the fact that the Old Company was able to force a merger with the New Company in 1701 when the Tories regained political power. The timing again suggests that shifts in political power contributed to successful attacks on trading privileges, including those of the New Company.
Fiscal instability was another important factor in the events following the Glorious
Revolution. The Nine Years War against France brought new levels of government expenditure.
To meet its fiscal needs, the government raised taxes and borrowing, including establishing the Bank of England in 1694. However, by 1697 expenditures were greatly outstripping revenues. Table 2 shows Dincecco's (2011) figures for English government revenues, expenditures, and the deficit ratio (expenditures-revenues)/revenues from 1690 to 1701. The deficit was building from 1693 and reached new heights in 1697. Recall that it was in 1697 that King William made it known that he expected a loan from the East India Company. As discussed earlier the Old Company's loan offer (£500,000) was one-fourth the offer by its rival (£2,000,000). Had the government's fiscal deficit not been so large, then perhaps the Old Company's modest offer would have been accepted and its privileges would have remained intact. 
V. The East Indian Monopoly from the Merger to the Accession of George III
The (Sutherland 1962, p. 29) . In the same session, the Company got an act of parliament extending its monopoly trading rights to at least 1769. In return the Company had to make a £200,000 payment to King George II and they had to accept a lower interest rate on the £3.2 million debt owed to them by the government.
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The events of 1730 reveal much about the political dynamics of Britain's social order at this time. After the Hanoverian succession of 1715, the Company became more connected to the Whig party, which held a majority in the Commons for many decades in the early to mideighteenth century (Sutherland 1962, p. 23 After 1744 the Company did not face any serious challenges regarding its charter until the late 1760s and even then its monopoly trading privileges were not seriously questioned. The relative security which the Company enjoyed was related to the evolution of Britain's politics and fiscal capacity. By the 1750s party strife had largely disappeared. The Whig party had held a majority in the Commons for over 35 years. Their long-time adversaries, the Tories, continued to challenge Whig policies, but according to Colley (1985) Revenues Expenditures century has been described by historians as one of the most 'striking changes in English history.'
According to historians like Plumb (1967) and Sutherland (1962, p. 18) , stability was due to the 'good sense and absence of rancor of the English landed and commercial classes' and to the skill and determination of Robert Walpole in consolidating and manipulating political power.
One Other long-term factors at work were the growth of fiscal capacity and financial development. Fiscal crises were less common after the mid-eighteenth century, even though the frequency and scale of warfare increased. One reason is that the government's fiscal capacity was much greater. O'Brien and Hunt (1993) show that British central government revenues per capita increased by over 60% between 1690 and 1750. The revenue increases were achieved through a combination tax innovations, bureaucratic innovations, and political developments. 1660  1663  1666  1669  1672  1675  1678  1681  1684  1687  1690  1693  1696  1699  1702  1705  1708  1711  1714  1717  1720  1723  1726  1729  1732  1735  1738  1741  1744 The growth of tax revenues helped build fiscal capacity but revenues alone were never sufficient to pay for Britain's wars. As figure 3 shows government expenditures peaked in times of war from 1692 to 1770. The East India Company was forced to lend to the Government in each of the wars up to 1750, but not during the Seven Years War from 1756 to 1763. What changed? Arguably one key development was the emergence of the Three Percent Consol, which was a redeemable, perpetual 3% annuity. As Neal (1993, p. 117) explains, there were several precedents to the Three Percent Consol from the 1720s. They allowed the Exchequer, Army, and Navy to issue bills in times of emergency and the bills could then be retired from the proceeds of selling new issues of perpetual annuities. Following the Consol and related financial innovations, the government had less need to seek emergency loans from the East India Company. Instead it could rely on conventional borrowing backed by tax levies. 1692  1695  1698  1701  1704  1707  1710  1713  1716  1719  1722  1725  1728  1731  1734  1737  1740  1743  1746  1749  1752  1755  1758  1761  1764  1767 annually to the government (Sutherland 1962) . The justification for this clause was the great expansion in Company's revenues following the acquisition of territory in Bengal. As it turns out the Company did not always make the annual payments due to large expenses and the weakness of trade in these years. The Company had to postpone its tax payments and even required loans from the government.
VI. The East Indian Monopoly in its Last
In 1778 the Secretary of Treasury, John Robinson, began preparing a bill to renegotiate the Company's charter as it was allowed to do after 1780. All options were on the table, and
Robinson proposed that the Company lend £2 million to the government in order to renew its monopoly for another term of years (Sutherland 1962, p. 340) . and it required that all dividends beyond 8% had to be split ¾ to the government and ¼ to shareholders. The agreement was approved by the King and Parliament in the 1781 charter act (Sutherland 1962 Manchester's aim was to lower the cost of exporting cotton textiles to India, which its manufacturers now produced at a lower cost than ever before due to technological changes in cotton spinning. The Company's monopoly was seen as obstructing their exports. Liverpool had similar aims but it also wanted exports to be shipped from its port rather than London, which was the hub of the Company's activity. It is apparent that one of the government's aims in the negotiations of 1792 was to set up a system where it could extract more revenues from India. It followed its traditional strategy of taxing the monopolist Company. The East India Company's finances had improved in the mid1780s and it was able to repay its debts to the government. If the Company carry on their trade more expensively and with less activity and industry than private individuals, it is unjust to the country, as well as the inhabitants of British India, that the exclusive monopoly should be continued; and in such a state of things, the trade is more likely to be advantages to the country, and beneficial to the individuals in their hands, than in those of the Company: but if the latter shall conduct it with skill and enterprise, and with due and unremitting attention to economy, the extent of their capital, and the superior facilities which they must continue to possess, of providing their investment in India at the cheapest rate, will undoubtedly afford them the means of successful rivalship with all other competitors.
Buckinghamshire was also the lead negotiator for the government on the renewal of the charter in 1812. Thus key government actors were pushing for a liberalization of the trade. The
Company opposed any weakening of its trading privileges, but unlike in 1793 it was not able to move the government to its side.
The effectiveness of the lobbying campaign for free trade is certainly one factor in swaying the government. Another factor was an unexpected weakening in the Company's political connections just as the negotiations for the charter were starting. On May 12, 1812 the Prime Minister Lord Perceval was assassinated. Lord Liverpool was named as the new Prime Minister and an election was held in October 1812. In the new parliament which opened in November 1812 the Company had 86 MPs, but only 28% were affiliated with the government and 31%
were affiliated with the opposition. This was much smaller than in April of 1812, where the Company had 89 MPs and 58% were affiliated with the government, while 38% were with the opposition (Philips 1961, pp. 321-25) . The Company's weak numbers seem to have hurt their cause when the trading provisions of the 1813 charter bill were being debated in the Commons.
In a revealing statement, a director in the Company said, "I had no idea we stood on such weak ground…from that moment I felt myself humbled."
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The long-term evolution of government finances was a final factor in the move to open trade in 1813. Throughout the Company's history, the government aimed to benefit financially from an East Indian monopoly. By the late eighteenth century, it levied special duties on East Indian imports and it collected a portion of the Company's monopoly profits. The latter policy is inefficient in a well-developed fiscal system because it relies on monopolizing the trade, which reduces social surplus. Over the course of the Napoleonic wars, Britain's tax revenues expanded by over 200% (Dincecco 2011) and even included an income tax for the first time. In this environment of greater fiscal capacity, the rationale for taxing a monopolist, instead of taxing an open market, no longer made sense. Of course, economic reasoning does not always win the day in policy making. The fact that reasoning did prevail in the early nineteenth century suggests that Britain had taken some key steps towards open access.
VII. Conclusion
Many markets in history are limited by laws and customs enforced by political authorities.
One prominent theory argues that the transition out of limited access requires a series of steps like rule of law for elites and the creation of perpetually lived organizations. This paper studies how these steps were taken in Britain in the case of the East Indian market. The Company had a legal monopoly over all trade between Britain and the East Indies, but its trading privileges were far from secure. The king and parliament authorized interlopers to enter the Company's market and it forced the Company to lend in order to retain its monopoly. The root causes behind these actions were the political instability and fiscal incapacity of British institutions in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century. The Company was politically connected, like most elite organizations, but these connections diminished when the government changed. Credibility was also weakened by the fiscal system which evolved slowly to meet the needs of warfare.
A secure East Indian monopoly only emerged in the mid-eighteenth century when political stability and fiscal capacity increased. The Company's trading privileges were renegotiated only after the terms of the charter expired, and not according to the dictates of politics and finance.
Thus after 1750 Britain was moving towards one of the doorstep conditions: rule of law for elites. However, the liberalization of the market had to wait several more decades. Monopoly remained stable because of the Company's strong political connections and also because the fiscal system had not yet reached full capacity. Further development of the fiscal system during the Napoleonic wars and a negative shock to the Company's connections following an assassination brought the monopoly to an end in 1813. In the ensuing decades, Britain's position in world markets, like Asia, would grow eventually leading to an industrial and colonial empire.
